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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify today. I have worked as a lawyer and
economist on regulatory and antitrust proceedings in the telecommunications industry for
twenty years. In the interest of disclosure, let me say that I have been a consultant to a
number of companies in the telecommunications, content, and software industries.1
Today, however, I am appearing on my own behalf. I do not represent any company, and
no one has paid me to prepare this testimony.

"Net neutrality" obligations would require a telecommunications carrier to operate its
broadband network so that no packet of information is treated as inferior to others in
terms of its urgency of delivery. Under "net neutrality" I can take comfort in knowing
that my son's Internet chatting about what agent Jack Bauer did on last night's episode of
24 will receive the same priority of delivery as my file transfer of this testimony to the
Committee's staff. The practical effect of "net neutrality" obligations would be to require
a telecommunications carrier to recover the full cost of its broadband network connection
through a uniform flat-rate charge imposed on all end users.

Companies like Google, eBay, and Yahoo! might believe that such an outcome works to
their private economic advantage, but that short-run view would neglect the disincentive
that "net neutrality" obligations would create for private investment in the very
broadband infrastructure upon which these companies rely to deliver their content and
applications to consumers.

Few industries studied by economists have received such intensive theoretical and
empirical analysis as telecommunications. Today, regulators in the United States and
other OECD nations understand very well how the unique cost characteristics and
demand characteristics of telecommunications networks affect market outcomes and the
efficacy of regulatory intervention. "Net neutrality" obligations are incompatible with
what we know about the economics of telecommunications. To understand the harm that
"net neutrality" obligations pose to economic welfare, Congress needs to appreciate six

2

salient economic features of telecommunications networks. These six economic
considerations underscore why Congress should not frustrate the ability of a
telecommunications company to recover the sunk costs of its broadband network in the
manner that least distorts consumer choices.

The first economic consideration is that a broadband network requires substantial sunk
investment.3 Private investors will fund the construction of a broadband network only if
there is a reasonable expectation that the company making that investment will recover
the cost of its investment, including a competitive return on capital. Sunk investment is
not a one-shot deal; sunk investment is made continuously over time. Therefore, as soon
as it is understood that a new regulatory obligation or regime like "net neutrality" will
jeopardize a firm's recovery of its sunk costs, the capital markets will demand a higher
risk-adjusted return. As the cost of capital rises, incremental sunk investment in the
network will be more costly for its owner, and the likelihood that the network will be
completed according to its originally intended scale will diminish.

The second economic consideration is that a broadband network exhibits economies of
scale. The large sunk costs of building a broadband network imply that the marginal cost
of providing service to one more consumer is very low. However, marginal cost pricing is
insufficient to recover even the average variable cost of the network, much less the
average total cost, which would be necessary to recover the sunk costs of building the
network. In economic theory, the solution to this problem is to charge consumers a lump
sum fee to recover the sunk costs and to price usage at marginal cost./

In a regime of regulated pricing, however, this solution is impossible for political reasons
because the lump sum fee could be enormous. So firms or regulators attempt to identify
what has become known as the "optimal departure from marginal cost pricing."4 The
third economic consideration is that a broadband network exhibits economies of scope. In
other words, there are synergistic "common costs" to producing multiple products over
the same network. The products may have substantially different demand characteristics,
including different price elasticities of demand. A multiproduct firm can earn
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contributions to the recovery of the sunk costs of its broadband network from each of its
services. Economic welfare is maximized when the pricing of each such product makes a
contribution to the recovery of sunk costs that is inversely related to its price elasticity of
demand. This pricing rule is known as Ramsey pricing.

The fourth economic consideration is that differential pricing, such as Ramsey pricing
can increase economic welfare because it enables a firm to lower the price to consumers
who would otherwise be priced out of the market if the firm were constrained to charge a
higher uniform price. Moreover, differential pricing is commonplace in competitive
markets (such as airlines, hotels, retailing, package delivery, personal computers, and
book publishing) because competition compels firms to adopt rival strategies to lower, to
the maximum extent possible, the prices that they charge pricesensitive consumers. It
would be perverse to prohibit owners of broadband networks from employing the same
differential pricing methodology that is routinely used by firms in competitive markets.

The fifth economic consideration is that telecommunications services have joint demand.
For example, a telephone call is valued by both the caller and the recipient, and a visit to
a website is valued by both the consumer doing the browsing and the owner of the
website. In a "two-sided" market of this sort, the demand that one party has for the
product is complementary to the demand that the other party has. Over-the-air television
programs are free to the viewer because advertisers pay broadcasters to assemble
audiences to receive advertisements. Google searches are free to Internet users because
Google sells highly focused advertising that responds to the interests revealed by the
Internet user's search request. Each party in a two-sided market can contribute to the
recovery of the sunk costs required to build a broadband network. There is no basis in
economic theory to presume that it would be socially optimal for end users to pay for all
of the cost of building a high-speed broadband network while the companies that deliver
content or applications to those same end users over that network and therefore derive
substantial economic advantage from its use pay nothing.

The sixth economic consideration is that telecommunications networks are susceptible to
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congestion. For that reason, correct price signals must be used at every possible point in
the network so that users who congest the network bear the social cost of their behavior.8
If, instead, the owner of a broadband network were constrained to charge the same price
to every end user, regardless of the amount of network congestion that the user created,
the result would be excess demand and reduced supply which is to say, shortages of
bandwidth.

These six economic factors counsel Congress not to frustrate the ability of a
telecommunications company to recover the sunk costs of its broadband network in the
manner that least distorts consumer choices. We know from Ramsey pricing that the least
distortionary method is to charge all persons or businesses that use the network, and to do
so in inverse relation to their respective price elasticities of demand. In that manner,
revenues earned from persons or businesses with the most price-insensitive demand for
broadband connections will permit the telecommunication carrier to reduce prices for
consumers who are more sensitive to price, including those with limited disposable
income. The result is an expansion of the scale and use of the network. Under differential
pricing, intense demanders of broadband delivery like Google or Yahoo! or eBay
probably would pay more for expedited delivery of the advertising that drives their
business models. For these users, conventional "best efforts" delivery may be insufficient.
In contrast, consumers who are the less intensive users of broadband capacity and who
would be satisfied with best-efforts delivery will find it more affordable to subscribe to
broadband for Internet access if they do not have to pay for higher network performance
than they need. It should come as no surprise that the New York Times reported two days
ago that America Online and Yahoo! "are about to start using a system that gives
preferential treatment to messages from companies that pay from 1/4 of a cent to a penny
each to have them delivered."

Congress also should not deny telecommunications carriers the freedom to supplement
subscriber revenue with their own advertising revenue. Newspapers, cable television
operators, and Internet service providers all have business models that rely on revenues
from both advertising and subscriptions. Unless Congress prohibits them from doing so,
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telecommunications carriers will also develop business models that generate advertising
revenue. That ancillary revenue will enable these carriers to reduce further the monthly
subscription price for broadband access.

In short, the enactment of "net neutrality" obligations would impose social costs. It would
reduce consumer welfare by forcing end users to pay more for broadband Internet access
or to forgo the service. At the same time, such obligations would not produce benefits in
terms of preventing anticompetitive behavior. A telecommunications carrier already lacks
the incentive to block a consumer's access to lawful content, because content and carriage
are complementary goods, not substitute goods. A telecommunications carrier also lacks
the incentive to degrade the quality of packets for VoIP services, because that
degradation would be quickly detected and could trigger antitrust or business tort
litigation.

Finally, the overarching reason why anticompetitive behavior of any sort is implausible is
that competition will constrain the market power of any given carrier. In most geographic
markets, four or more separate firms will supply broadband Internet access. It will be
supplied over the fixed network of the regional Bell operating company or other local
telephone company, over the fixed network of the local cable television operator, and
over two (if not three) wireless networks in addition to the wireless network affiliated
with the local RBOC.

To conclude, the legislative agenda of the "net neutrality" movement ignores the essential
cost and demand characteristics of telecommunications networks. It also posits that the
current marketplace will produce implausible competitive harms. Congress faces many
important questions as it revises the Communications Act, but the imposition of "net
neutrality" obligations is not one of them.
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